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Abstract
Terrorist attacks in the United States and in Western Europe have been
rare, and public awareness of the terrorist menace has largely been
molded by a few horrific events. In contrast, other countries have ex-
perienced chronic terrorism, with attacks on buses, restaurants, coffee
shops, and retail establishments. In this review, we assess the impact
of terrorism on civilian society in the United States, Northern Ireland,
and Israel. We examine the psychological effects, the adaptations made
by individuals to enhance their safety, and the consequent adjustments
made by institutional actors and by commercial establishments to en-
sure continued economic viability. We review the various theories of
societal adjustments to exogenous shocks and point out that a very dif-
ferent formulation is required for the case of chronic terrorism than for
the societal experience of a one-time attack.
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INTRODUCTION
Terrorism has become a prominent topic of
public discourse in the twenty-first century.
While hardly unknown in previous eras (e.g.,
the Baider-Minehoff gang, the Weathermen,
and the much earlier Narodnaya Volya), with
few exceptions terrorism was not a factor in the
everyday life of residents of Western countries
until recently. Reflecting the low salience of this
phenomenon prior to the attacks of September
11, 2001, in the United States—and possibly
because of what Joas (2003) has decried as a
utopian bias in examining society without its
wars and conflicts—social science research gave
only passing consideration to terrorism in dis-
cussions of collective behavior.
The 9/11 attacks and the similar assaults
in Great Britain and Spain changed the ter-
rain and have stimulated an immense amount
of writing and research on terrorism. Most of
this work has focused on the perpetrators, with
the goal of illuminating the characteristics of
terrorist groups—their motives, organizational
structure, recruitment strategies, tactics, and
support bases (e.g., Hoffman 2006, Victoroff
2005, Turk 2004). Much attention has been
given to issues of definition:1 how to distinguish
terrorism from related phenomena such as
guerrilla warfare, lynching, and political assassi-
nation (National Research Council 2002; Tilly
2004; Smelser 2007, pp. 229–46). In the pro-
cess, researchers have noted that terror is used
by a range of actors not usually thought of as
terrorists—e.g., the Mafia threatens and intim-
idates to enforce compliance with extortion de-
mands; Great Britain obliterated Dresden with
1While matters of definition are relevant to investigations
of most social phenomena, they are rarely accorded much
space in research reports. However, this is not the case with
studies of terrorism, in part because of the political implica-
tions of this designation (e.g., terrorists versus freedom fight-
ers). Thus, the brief report by the National Research Coun-
cil (2002) gives five pages to issues of definition; Hoffman
(2006) devotes a chapter and Smelser (2007) an appendix to
definitional problems. A fairly consensual formulation is that
terrorism is politically motivated violence, carried out by in-
dividuals and nonstate organizations with the intent of influ-
encing an audience beyond the immediate victims (Shughart
2006).
the intent of demoralizing the civilian popula-
tion of Germany (National Research Council
2002, p. 15).
The literature on terrorists and terrorist
organizations is now quite voluminous and
permits some previously held notions to be
discarded. Thus, based on interviews with
captured terrorists, there is little evidence of
psychopathology or of personality disorder as
factors in their behavior (Atran 2003, Sagerman
2004). Also, terrorists do not come from the
economically deprived segments of a society
(Atran 2003, Krueger & Maleckova 2003);
rather, their commitment appears to stem from
prosocial attitudes—a deep identification with
the values and aspirations of their community
(Krueger 2007, chapter 1; Turk 2004; also
Haddad 2004 on social support for terrorists).
In this sense, the self-sacrifice of a suicide
bomber is reminiscent of Durkheim’s altruistic
suicide category.
With respect to organizations that use
terror, Ricolfi (2005) and Victoroff (2005) see
terror attacks as part of the repertoire of strate-
gies a militant group might employ in pursuing
its objectives, whether to cast off oppression,
attain a religious goal, or cleanse a country from
an unwanted ethnic population. Acts of terror
bring deeply felt grievances to the attention
of an otherwise indifferent public. They raise
the cost of defending the status quo, and the
desire for a cessation of the attacks provides the
terrorist group with a bargaining chip in nego-
tiations (Hoffman 2006, chapter 8; Gambetta
2005, chapter 8). There are special advantages
from suicide attacks: They do not require
sophisticated equipment; they are the ultimate
“smart bomb”; when successful there is no
assailant to interrogate; and they convey to the
public the depth of commitment to the cause.
If we are beginning to develop a coherent
understanding of terrorist groups and the char-
acteristics of their members, we are less far
along in our comprehension of the adjustments
made by residents and by organizational ac-
tors in an impacted country. Yet such consid-
erations tap issues of both the effectiveness of
terrorism as a strategy and notions of societal
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resiliency: how the cascading effects of the dis-
ruptions are managed, the types of adaptations
made by individuals and families, the costs to
different sectors of the economy, and the for-
mulation of government policies intended to
maintain normalcy in a menacing environment.
It is this array of issues, concerning the scope
and breadth of a society’s response to terror-
ist attacks, that are the concerns of the present
article.
Conceptualization and theory development
with respect to societal adjustments are very
much a function of the attack history in a coun-
try. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween two quite different kinds of experiences
with terrorism—the case of a single event (or
small number of attacks), massive in scale and
directed at critical infrastructure sites or tar-
gets of symbolic significance, and the case of
repeated attacks over many years in which the
targets can be quite varied.
The first sort of experience, exemplified by
the 9/11 attack in the United States and by more
recent bombings in Great Britain and Spain,
has given rise to a literature that emphasizes
prevention and preparedness for a future as-
sault of similar, catastrophic proportions. The
focus in this literature is on the form a next at-
tack might take (whether nuclear, chemical, or
biological), on countermeasures for interdict-
ing an attempt, and on strategies for mitigating
the impact of a successful attack—training first
responders, ensuring interoperability of com-
munications equipment, stockpiling medical
supplies, and the like. This type of experience
has also produced a rich literature on the psy-
chological reactions to an attack.
The second type of exposure to terror-
ism has generated a literature that augments
the aforementioned issues with analyses of the
behavioral responses to an ongoing terrorist
threat. Here, the presumption is that the ex-
perience of repeated attacks has encouraged in-
dividuals to modify their routine activities in
order to minimize future risk, and this has per-
turbed the social system from its prior equilib-
rium. A search then ensues for new social ar-
rangements that are compatible with personal
safety; this, in turn, requires adaptations on the
part of commercial establishments and by other
organizational actors seeking to maintain their
viability. Examples of countries and regions that
have had this sort of experience with terror-
ism are Israel, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and
northern India.
We discuss the literatures relevant to both
histories of exposure in this review. However,
because our main interest concerns issues of so-
cietal resiliency and organizational adaptation
in the face of a terrorist threat, the second is
of greater relevance. In the context of repeated
attacks, the adjustments tend to be long last-
ing and more deeply assimilated into the fabric
of the society than in cases of a single attack,
however massive in scale. Also, because there
is a considerable research literature on the im-
pact of terrorism in Israel, we draw much of
our material from that country, although we
supplement the Israeli experience with studies
in other countries, especially the United States
and Northern Ireland.
A SINGULAR MASSIVE ATTACK
Three targets were struck on September 11,
2001—the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and a commercial airplane on its way to
Washington, DC. In the mind of the public
and in the research literature, however, this date
is most deeply associated with the destruction
of the World Trade Center. In the studies that
have examined the consequences of the 9/11
attack, two themes are emphasized: the mental
health effects on the population and methods to
enhance the preparedness of the country, given
the possibility of a future terrorist attack.
The social science community has partici-
pated in this endeavor. As part of the under-
taking, there has been a search for theoreti-
cal frameworks that would permit an efficient
assessment of the consequences of a terrorist
attack. From an applied perspective, the im-
portance of theory would be to forecast the
likely effects of an attack on population morale
and societal functioning—how the impact dif-
fers by type of attack, choice of target, and
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characteristics of the impacted population, and,
further, how the ensuing disruptions are ab-
sorbed and managed.
To the extent that an inductive approach
is taken to theory construction, which is
characteristic of the work in this area, the U.S.
experience of a very few terrorist attacks is a
liability. The number of observations can be
increased by adding to the list the Oklahoma
City bombing in 1995 and the anthrax mailings
of 2001, as well as the large-scale attacks in
Tokyo, London, and Madrid. However, no
literature has compared these attack sites in
terms of the impact on community and on insti-
tutional arrangements, aside from some studies
of mental health effects (e.g., Valverde 2005,
Vazquez et al. 2006). Rather, the approach
taken to theory development at the level of
organization and community effects has largely
been one of extrapolating from the literature
on disasters, a research area that received much
attention in the 1950s and 1960s (Barton 1963,
1969; Baker & Chapman 1962; Quarantelli
& Dynes 1977) and has benefited from a
resurgence of interest following Hurricane
Katrina (Pais & Elliot 2008, Tierney 2007).
The disasters literature is certainly
relevant—a successful terror attack is a trau-
matic event for the affected community, and
there are similarities in the response, whether
the cause is natural or the workings of a
malevolent actor. It is also the case that enough
communities have been stricken by natural and
industrial disasters that one can theorize about
organizational and community reactions. Thus,
the National Research Council (2002) resorted
to the disaster paradigm in its discussion of
community responses to terrorist strikes; sim-
ilarly, Smelser (2007, chapter 5) and Fullerton
et al. (2003) utilize this framework in their
consideration of the impact of terrorist attacks.
The imagery that is central to the disaster
paradigm is one of an impulse shock to the social
system, which is then associated with a succes-
sion of stages in the community’s response. As
summarized by the National Research Council
(2002, pp. 40–41), the stages are (a) initial dis-
belief and denial, (b) a rush to the scene of the
disaster, (c) the development of solidarity in the
affected community, (d ) subsequent scapegoat-
ing and blame of individuals believed to have
been remiss in preparation or response, and
(e) a gradual return to routine activities. The
Council’s report adds the assessment that each
of these stages was present in the aftermath of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The disasters literature is nuanced in its cov-
erage of both community and individual re-
sponses. One theme that has received much at-
tention concerns role behavior and role conflict,
with clear findings that family responsibilities
intrude into the performance of organizational
roles. Thus, first responders who are unsure of
the safety of family members are more likely
to abandon work than are responders with-
out family in the impacted area. At the same
time, shock and panic reactions are less com-
mon among persons who have family responsi-
bilities. Other findings include a heightening of
community solidarity and a reduction in crime
following a disaster, a recognition of the im-
portance of clear lines of organizational juris-
diction, and the status of the public as a source
of volunteers and supplies but also an obstacle
to efficient recovery operations (Killian 1952,
Form & Nosnow 1958, Barton 1962, Hill &
Hanson 1962, Tierney 2007).
These themes are echoed in the writings on
9/11. However, an essential difference between
a natural disaster and a terrorist attack is the
presence in the latter of a designing actor who
is intent on inflicting pain and suffering. This
is a distinction of consequence because just as a
nation learns from an attack about ways to in-
crease its vigilance, the agile terrorist can adapt
by changing the location and method of attack
(Fullerton et al. 2003, p. 4). This makes it dif-
ficult for a threatened community to protect
itself, and the disruption in feelings of security
is a potent generator of stress (Baum & Dougall
2002). Indeed, the psychological impact of ter-
ror may have less to do with destructive power
than with its ability to evoke fear and anxi-
ety. Thus, in assessing the effects of different
types of traumatic events, Fullerton et al. (2003,
p. 6) have ranked terrorism as one of “the most
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powerful and pervasive generators of psychi-
atric illness, distress, and disrupted community
and social functioning.”
The disaster model is especially problem-
atic for the case of multiple attacks over a long
time period—what we term “chronic terror-
ism.” Here, issues of psychiatric illness and ef-
fects on population morale cannot be tied to the
onset of a particular strike, and the ensuing or-
ganizational adjustments tend to be long lasting
and permeate deeply into the societal fabric. In
short, the impulse model of system disruption
lacks verisimilitude in mimicking the adapta-
tion to this experience with terrorism. While
the imagery in disaster studies pertains to rare
events, the experiences of Israel and Northern
Ireland make the threat of attack an ongoing
risk (Tierney 2007).
Psychological Effects
What, then, has been learned about the con-
sequences of the World Trade Center attack?
Since the problem of small N can be avoided
in studies using individual-level data, there is a
robust literature on the mental health effects of
this assault, indexed by symptoms of fear, anx-
iety, and depression. Thus, in a national sur-
vey of stress reactions in the week following the
attack, Schuster et al. (2001) found that 44%
of adults reported substantial symptoms. The
magnitude of the effect differed by social char-
acteristics. Women reported greater stress than
did men; distance from the World Trade Center
was negatively associated with stress; and hours
of television viewing of the attack showed a pos-
itive correlation, though this last finding raises
concerns of causal direction and endogeneity.
Respondents coped with the stress by talking
about the attack, turning to religion, and mak-
ing donations.
Some two months after the World Trade
Center attack, Galea et al. (2002) surveyed
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and depression in Manhattan and
found elevated levels. Even within this bor-
ough, there was a strong effect of distance from
the site (20.0% of lower Manhattan residents
reported PTSD symptoms versus 6.8% in up-
per Manhattan); also, individuals who witnessed
the towers collapse reported elevated stress,
as did persons involved in the rescue effort.
Similar to the earlier survey, women reported
more severe symptoms than did men. A fur-
ther analysis of the data (Vlahov et al. 2002)
showed that the psychological distress was ex-
pressed behaviorally with increased consump-
tion of cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana.
Jones et al. (2006) describe the differential
effects of the attacks on civilians and emergency
service personnel in New York, noting the very
high rate of stress-related maladies among fire
department rescue workers. The illnesses did
not occur immediately, and the authors spec-
ulate that they were exacerbated by repeated
exposure to the impact site and by the cumula-
tion of funerals that were attended by the fire-
fighters. Delayed onset of stress disorders have
also been reported by Holman et al. (2008).
In a three-year follow-up of a national sam-
ple that had completed a health survey prior
to 9/11, Holman and colleagues examined the
extent to which stress reactions predicted later
cardiovascular outcomes. Adjusting for exoge-
nous risk factors (pre-9/11 cardiovascular and
mental health symptoms) and degree of expo-
sure to the attack (hours watched of TV cov-
erage), they concluded that symptoms of acute
stress shortly after the attack were responsible
for a 53% increase in cardiovascular ailments.
The results reported by Schuster et al.
(2001) concerning the association of distress
feelings with physical and psychological prox-
imity to the attack (the latter indexed by amount
of television viewing) appear to be robust in
that Schlenger et al. (2002), using a different
national sample, noted similar effects for the
distance variables. Indeed, viewing the World
Trade Center attack on television had much
the same stress impact as physical proximity.
For this reason, it is not surprising that there
is evidence of strong emotional and behavioral
reactions to the 9/11 strike from as far away as
Great Britain (Salib 2003).
Studies of terror attacks in other coun-
tries have produced findings that are largely
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consistent with the World Trade Center event.
Vazquez et al. (2006), analyzing stress re-
actions in Madrid in the week following the
March 11, 2004, attack in that city, found ele-
vated PTSD levels. Again, the stress was higher
among women, among residents who lived near
the attack site, and among TV viewers of the
event, though the last effect was small. An as-
sessment of reactions to the London bombing
of July 7, 2005 (Rubin et al. 2005), showed
a similar result for gender, although physical
proximity had no effect. Additionally, Muslims
in Great Britain evidenced greater distress than
persons of other faiths, and individuals who
were uncertain about the fate of family mem-
bers showed elevated stress; neither result is re-
markable. What is noteworthy, and is discussed
below, are findings of higher distress levels in
persons who had no prior experience with ter-
rorism (34% versus 23%), and of intentions to
change mode of transportation in light of the
attack—less use of trains and buses (32%) and
greater reliance on autos.
Rubin et al. (2005) claim that the trau-
matic impact of the London attack was less se-
vere than the psychological effects of the strike
on the World Trade Center. They attribute
the difference to the greater loss of life in the
United States but also speculate about the in-
uring effect of exposure to terrorism over a
long period, such as had been the experience of
Londoners from the IRA bombings. Interest-
ingly, a similar assessment, referencing Basque
terrorism, was proposed by Lopez-Rousseau
(2005) to explain why Spaniards exhibited a rel-
atively mild reaction to the March 11 bomb-
ing in Madrid, though his conclusion is based
on changes in transportation usage, not trauma
symptoms.
The theme of acclimation to chronic terror
is developed in the next section with respect
to Israel and Northern Ireland; both countries
have had to cope with multiple attacks. What
we note here is that the challenge of terrorism
to personal security has a very different trajec-
tory in the case of a single attack. In particular,
Baum & Dougall (2002) point to the role of
“low points” in the experience of a traumatic
event—the moment when an impacted popula-
tion concludes that the worst is over and that
matters will now improve. Disasters and singu-
lar terrorist attacks have low points, but cases of
repeated terror lack an evident transition—the
all clear signal might never come—suggesting
that high levels of stress and anxiety could be-
come a permanent fixture in such countries.
At the same time, others (e.g., Lopez-Rousseau
2005, Rubin et al. 2005) have written of the in-
uring effects of repeated assaults, which would
operate to moderate the stress reaction to a new
attack.
Social and Organizational Responses
to a Single Attack
The literature about 9/11 suggests that the ef-
fects on the U.S. economy were modest. For
several days after the strike the stock markets
were closed and there was a steep sell-off when
they reopened (the DOW index declined by
14%), but in subsequent weeks the recovery
was rapid. Insurance companies, airlines, and
the tourist sector showed a longer period of
recession (Lenain et al. 2002, Jackson 2008).
There also were a variety of short-term dis-
locations in New York City: an oversupply of
rental space in tall buildings, declines in em-
ployment and earnings, and a reduction in ho-
tel occupancy (Chernick 2005). However, the
overall assessment by Chernick is one of re-
silience and a rapid return to normality fol-
lowing the attack. Bruck & Wickstrom (2004),
summarizing the findings from a symposium on
economic consequences of terror, largely con-
cur with this appraisal. In contrast, Frey et al.
(2007) suggest that terrorism leads to a lessen-
ing in life satisfaction (formulated as the mon-
etary value of a reduction in the risk of harm).
However, the modest behavioral changes made
so far by Americans do not support this pes-
simistic contention.
In the main, this literature has focused on
issues of prevention and preparation. It is re-
plete with discussions of detection methods
for the various noxious materials a terrorist
might employ, of strategies for reducing the
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vulnerability of potential targets, and of ap-
proaches to organizing first responders (e.g.,
Kirschenbaum 2006, Grosskopf 2006, Howitt
& Pangi 2003); much of this work was funded
by the Department of Homeland Security. The
influence of the disaster-response model is ev-
ident in these writings. In comparison, while
countries that have experienced repeated ter-
ror attacks certainly have the same concerns,
those literatures are more attuned to adjust-
ments made by individuals in order to minimize
their risk—namely, the dynamics of the adap-
tations, differences by population groups, and
implications of the behavioral changes for insti-




Northern Ireland and Israel have each been
the site of repeated terrorist attacks over many
years. In regard to Northern Ireland, Curran
& Miller (2001) report that between 1969 and
1999 there were 3740 deaths attributable to
“the troubles,” the term by which this con-
flict is known; civilians accounted for some 54%
of these casualties. Similarly, Israel has a long
history of living with terrorism, dating to its
founding in 1948. In the most recent wave of
violence, the attacks have been carried out by
Palestinians, crossing into Israel from Gaza and
the occupied West Bank. During the period
2000–2005, there were 135 attacks with at least
one fatality, accounting for 588 deaths (calcu-
lations from data of the International Institute
for Counter Terrorism 2005).
While chronic terrorism has dominated
daily life in each country, the structural
underpinnings of the two conflicts bear few
similarities, and quite different psychological
and behavioral responses have been elicited.
The violence in Northern Ireland is an out-
growth of communal strife between religious
denominations that reside in neighborhoods
adjacent to one another, scattered throughout
the country. Each has an affiliated paramilitary
organization that provides protection but that
also undertakes bombings and shootings of
civilians on the other side, either to exact
retribution for a past attack or to cleanse a
mixed neighborhood of unwanted residents.
For our purposes, an essential feature is that the
terrorist attacks have taken place in a context
that is marked by diverse manifestations of
sectarian conflict—marches, riots, and pitched
battles between the paramilitary groups. While
the bombings and shootings have the character
of terrorist attacks, it is difficult to distinguish
their effects on the population from those of
the other expressions of the conflict.
Terrorism in Israel, by contrast, has oc-
curred in the context of an asymmetric relation-
ship between Israelis and Palestinians. Within
the boundaries of the state there is ethnic and
religious tension but no contending groups
in armed conflict with one another; indeed,
there is a considerable consensus (among Jewish
Israelis) with regard to the goal of maintaining
a democratic state with a Jewish patina. Rather,
terrorism has emerged from the frustrations of
Palestinian residents of Gaza and the West Bank
who do not accept Israel as a legitimate state
and who have limited opportunity to fulfill their
own national aspirations. These frustrations are
aggravated by the settlement policies of Israel
in the West Bank,2 as well as by an unwill-
ingness of leaders on both sides to negotiate
a compromise.
In Israel, then, terrorism in recent years
has taken the form of cross-border attacks
from the Palestinian territories, often by suicide
bombers. The targets have been restaurants, re-
tail stores, buses, and other places where crowds
gather. As a societal setting that has absorbed
the attacks, aside from the fact of repeated as-
saults, the Israeli experience resembles more
2Although not addressed in this review, there have been ter-
rorist attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the
West Bank. These attacks are not considered here because
our focus is on the societal response to terrorism, and there
is little information on adaptations by the Palestinian popula-
tion to the violence committed against them. A closely related
issue, that of Palestinian life under the Israeli occupation of
the West Bank, is discussed in Allen (2008) and Rosenfeld
(2004).
www.annualreviews.org • Societal Responses to Terrorist Attacks 173
ANRV381-SO35-09 ARI 29 March 2009 6:32
closely that of the United States than Northern
Ireland, the latter with its contending commu-
nities locked in a dance of violence.
Coping Style in Northern Ireland
In the case of chronic terrorism, the litera-
ture has addressed somewhat different ques-
tions from those in a single attack. The key
new ingredient is that of coping style, a recog-
nition of the fact that the threat is omnipresent
and that an individual is continually at risk in
his or her daily activities. Coping style refers
to how individuals manage the risk; it has both
a social and a psychological dimension. At the
social level, the literature examines rational ad-
justments by individuals, such as avoidance of
high-risk settings, and the consequent adapta-
tions by commercial actors seeking to maintain
their viability. At the psychological level, coping
style refers to an individual’s cognitive process-
ing of terror and trauma—essentially the way
that these stressors are internalized and inte-
grated into a person’s psyche.
The linkage between trauma and psycho-
logical coping style is most strongly articu-
lated in the writings on Northern Ireland. As
Dorahy & Paterson (2005) note, sectarian strife
has been intricately woven into the fabric of
the country, with shootings and bombings not
an extraordinary occurrence during the past
30 years. Consequently, many of the symptoms
of PTSD cited in Vazquez et al. (2006, p. 66)
that are taken as indicators of emotional ill-
ness in the case of a single terrorist attack (e.g.,
hypervigilance, avoidance of places associated
with the trauma) can, in fact, be functional for
survival in the context of an ongoing existen-
tial threat. In essence, a new normality develops
that fits the parameters of an abnormal social
environment.
Analogous to studies of the World Trade
Center attack, the literature on Northern
Ireland includes routine examinations of post-
traumatic stress reactions. However, the find-
ings from this body of research are not con-
sistent. Some have argued that the conflict
has generated pervasive emotional trauma (e.g.,
Loughrey et al. 1988, Dorahy & Paterson
2005), while other investigators find only mod-
est effects on psychiatric morbidity (Curran
1988, Muldoon et al. 2000, Murphy & Lloyd
2007).
In recognition of the unique conflictual
terrain of Northern Ireland, the conceptual
formulation of psychological effects has been
broadened by a consideration of “dissocia-
tion” and “dissociative coping style” (Dorahy &
Paterson 2005, Dorahy et al. 2006). Dissocia-
tive coping refers to the emotional processing of
trauma using defenses such as denial, avoidance,
and distancing, in place of a more healthy in-
tegration of the totality of a horrific experience
into the psychic self (Middleton 2004). It often
takes the form of splitting reality into the good
and bad, rather than accepting the grayness of
most experiences. Dissociative coping has par-
ticular relevance to the conflict in Northern
Ireland because it facilitates the projection of
blame and hostility onto the opposing commu-
nity, while heightening solidarity within one’s
own group.
An anomalous finding from the research on
Northern Ireland is that dissociative coping can
have a positive effect on mental health and on
the processing of acute stress, despite the dis-
tortion of reality associated with this defense
mechanism (Curran 1988, Curran & Miller
2001). The splitting of reality provides a tar-
get for rage and anger, but it also provides a
supportive community that can validate one’s
traumatic experience and help ward off feel-
ings of grief and helplessness (Middleton 2004,
Dorahy & Paterson 2005). In general, dissocia-
tive coping appears to fit well with the sort of
psychological adaptation that is functional in a
conflict characterized by intense sectarian vio-
lence. At the same time, by heightening feel-
ings of suspicion and reducing empathy for the
other, this coping style deepens the division be-
tween the communities and makes reconcilia-
tion and resolution of the conflict that much
more difficult (Muldoon et al. 2000, Campbell
& Healey 1999).
This is a painful literature to review because
it makes clear the corrosive effects of intractable
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sectarian violence, especially in an ecological
setting with intertwined neighborhoods, and
the resulting psychological burden on the in-
habitants of the country. Over time, the so-
cial consequences of the conflict have come
to include heightened residential segregation
and the abandonment of mixed neighborhoods,
hesitancy in crossing boundary lines, and a con-
sequent duplication of commercial activities,
schools, and health-care facilities (Curran 1988,
Campbell & Healey 1999). Clearly, we are deal-
ing here with much more than the effects of
terrorist attacks; rather, this is a society that is
deeply fractured, socially and politically. The
combination of these two factors provides a fer-
tile terrain for dissociative coping as a style of
psychological adaptation.
It is of some interest to speculate about
the different trajectories in the level of stress
symptomology in Northern Ireland and in the
United States. In the former, the possibility of
terrorist violence became part of the normal-
ity, and people adopted a coping style that fit
with this precarious existence. Indeed, young
persons who grew up without ever knowing a
safe environment exhibited low levels of dis-
tress during the troubles ( Joseph et al. 1993,
Murray & Clifford 1988). Since the Belfast
agreement of 1998, however, there has been an
increase in stress symptoms, raising the possi-
bility that the prior coping strategies might well
be maladaptive for psychological well-being in
a peaceful setting (McDonald 2007, Muldoon
et al. 2000). In contrast, the one-time attack of
September 11 was outside the range of normal
experience for residents of the United States.
It provoked much acute stress but did not al-
ter one’s concept of normality or require a
modification of coping style. As a result, with
the passage of time, the heightened stress level
receded.
Resiliency in Israel
In studies of the Israeli experience, the for-
mulation of psychological effects has taken a
different direction. Although Israelis have had
to confront chronic terrorism, their society is
relatively cohesive,3 not riven by violent sec-
tarian contention. In Israel, terrorism does not
have the flavor of punishment or retribution,
nor has it served the goal of clearing out mixed
neighborhoods. Rather, the intent behind the
attacks conforms with the traditional objectives
of terrorist groups, namely to demoralize a pop-
ulation by highlighting the inability of the gov-
ernment to protect its citizenry, with the hope
of using the threat of mayhem to secure favor-
able terms in negotiation. In this situation, the
matter that is problematic for the society, and
the theme that is emphasized in research stud-
ies on Israel, is that of resiliency in the face of
repeated attacks. This theme appears in several
guises: in studies of population morale, in exam-
inations of coping styles and their consistency
with sound mental health, as well as in broader
formulations of the emotional well-being of the
Israeli population.
Interestingly, research on the Israeli expe-
rience has made little use of the literature on
Northern Ireland, though there are many ref-
erences to the World Trade Center attack in
the United States and to studies of acute stress
spawned by that event. Using data collected
a few days after a wave of terrorist assaults,
Gidron et al. (2004) report higher levels of
PTSD in women than in men, a finding that
appears to be robust across countries, but a less-
ening of the symptoms to the extent that the
government is perceived as being in control of
the threat. Shalev et al. (2006) add the finding
that proximity to an attack site—a strong cor-
relate of stress symptoms in U.S. studies—had
no impact on PTSD in Israel, with the inter-
pretation that Israelis feel exposed and vulner-
able irrespective of where they reside. Stecklov
3Arab citizens of Israel constitute some 20% of the popula-
tion. Although they express solidarity with their Jewish coun-
terparts, this cohesion is to some extent imposed on them by
the Jewish majority. There has been some research on their
reactions to terrorist attacks on Israel, and these studies are
discussed in this review. With respect to Jewish citizens, there
has been a decline in cohesion from a very high level in the
initial years of the state. See Cohen (1988) for a temporal
analysis of social cohesion in Israel (proxied by the emigra-
tion rate) in relation to external threats.
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& Goldstein (2004) have linked the stress lit-
erature to “acting out” behavior. Using data on
automobile traffic circulation and traffic acci-
dents, they find a spike in fatalities three days
following an attack. While acknowledging that
a three-day lag is a puzzle—why not two or four
days—Stecklov & Goldstein note that response
lags of this length have been reported in stud-
ies of homicides after boxing matches and in
investigations of imitative suicides.
Coping is a theme in the terrorism liter-
atures of both Israel and Northern Ireland,
though the concerns of researchers in the two
countries are different and there are few cross-
references. In the Israeli materials, there is no
discussion of dissociative coping, a cognitive
style that might have been adaptive in Northern
Ireland but that is recognized as an emo-
tional disorder (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion 2000, pp. 519–33). Rather, the emphasis in
Israel is on coping as a behavioral strategy for
confronting mortal risk. Thus, Gidron et al.
(1999) in an examination of bus commuters4
distinguish between “emotion-focused coping”
(e.g., denial of the risk; self-distraction to re-
duce anxiety) and “problem-focused coping,”
(e.g., reporting suspicious packages; avoiding
high-risk commuter lines). They conclude that
while problem-focused coping has clear pro-
tective value, it is less efficacious than denial or
calming distractions in reducing anxiety.
Bleich et al. (2003) used the same coping
style categories with a representative national
sample. They find that instrumental modes of
coping, which they associate with sound emo-
tional health, are far more common; only a small
proportion of the Israeli population appears to
use self-distraction or denial to reduce anxiety.
Studies of adolescents (e.g., Braun-Lewensohn
et al. 2008, Tatar & Amram 2007) have come to
4Israelis feel especially exposed when using public transporta-
tion. In the two year period 2000–2002, attacks on buses, on
trains, and at bus stations resulted in 171 deaths. Gallows
humor can be a form of coping: “You know the difference
between Russian roulette and Israeli roulette? In Russian
roulette, you choose your bullet. Here you just pick a bus”
(Bennett 2002, p. 1).
a similar conclusion, namely that the majority
utilize problem-solving strategies. Of some in-
terest is the differential coping by Palestinian
and Jewish citizens of Israel in light of the
source of the terrorist attacks. Hobfoll et al.
(2006) examine stress symptoms in the two pop-
ulations, noting that Palestinians were much
more likely than Jews to report PTSD and
depressive symptoms. Whereas it is easy for
Jewish Israelis to express solidarity in the face
of the threat, Palestinians are more affected
emotionally as deep issues of identity surface
for them. Thus, a Durkheimian explanation of
the impact of an external threat on group sol-
idarity makes sense for the Jewish population,
but the circumstance of the Palestinian citizens
probably requires a cognitive dissonance type of
formulation.
The literature on population morale also
addresses resiliency, but from a more soci-
ological perspective. Zussman et al. (2007)
examine the effects of terrorism on life satis-
faction (happiness) during the Palestinian In-
tifada, concluding that the attacks had practi-
cally no impact on the morale of Jewish Israelis,
thereby casting doubt on their effectiveness
in achieving the terrorist goal of demoralizing
an enemy population. Consistent with Hobfoll
et al. (2006), they find a negative effect of ter-
rorism on the morale of Palestinian citizens.
Zussman & Romanov (2006) report results that
are only partially consistent with Zussman et al.
(2007), noting that major attacks (more than
5 deaths) reduce subjective well-being on the
day of the event, but that the effect dissipates
within a few days. Assessing this literature,
Elran (2006) concludes that Israelis remained
resilient during the years of the Intifada and that
whenever the volume of the attacks decreased,
tension lessened and there was a return to rou-
tine patterns of behavior.
The theme of social resilience receives
its fullest development in an edited volume
by Friedland et al. (2005). The chapter by
Kirschenbaum (2005) on adaptations to the
threat of attack provides considerable detail
on coping behavior. Based on a sample of
800 households, representative of the Israeli
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population, Kirschenbaum reports that 12%
of respondents had personally been present
at an attack; a further 60% were acquainted
with a victim of terrorist violence—quite high
exposure rates for a national population. Re-
garding modes of coping, Kirshenbaum notes
a heavy emphasis on problem-solving adap-
tations. Behavioral changes as a result of the
threat include greater reliance on taxis than
buses, sitting near the vehicle’s exit when board-
ing a bus, patronizing retail establishments that
have guards, and entertaining more at home,
but also a greater reliance on faith and prayer
(Kirschenbaum 2005, Table 3). Kirschenbaum’s
examination of individual adaptations in differ-
ent behavioral areas brings us to a consideration
of the consequent adjustments made by institu-
tions and required of commercial actors in or-
der to remain economically viable in a context
of ongoing terrorist activity.
CHRONIC TERRORISM: EFFECTS
ON ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS
Institutions play a central role in determining
the response to terror by residents of a coun-
try. Whereas individuals alter their behavior in
seeking to cope with the insecurity, organiza-
tional actors condition the sorts of adjustments
that can be made. At the same time, organiza-
tions may find themselves in a dramatically al-
tered environment, requiring them to develop
new arrangements to meet the perceived safety
needs of the public.
This topic is almost uniquely the province of
research on Israel. For reasons already noted,
the case of a single massive attack is viewed
as so very distant from normality that it has
prompted few modifications in the daily rou-
tines of individuals. Northern Ireland did expe-
rience chronic terrorism; however, accounts of
the effects on commercial firms and on other
organizations are few, pretty much limited to
reports of the duplication of services that arose
from the rending of the society along sectarian
lines (e.g., O’Farrell 2005). Some attention has
been given to the summary costs of the pro-
tracted conflict in Northern Ireland, with the
finding that there has been heightened emigra-
tion, loss of tourist revenue, and high expen-
ditures for security ( Jackson et al. 2007). This
assessment, however, is based on aggregate data
for the region, without an exploration of the de-
tails of the adjustments made by individuals and
organizations.
A study of taxi drivers in Belfast by Gambetta
& Hamill (2005) is an exception. During the
troubles, taxi drivers were the target of hijack-
ings and shootings by paramilitary groups. Taxi
firms responded by organizing into separate
companies in Protestant and Catholic areas that
took fares only to destinations within the re-
spective community; a different type of firm—
“public hire” taxis—traversed sectarian bound-
aries. In the case of the former, the problem for
taxi drivers was to ascertain that a fare was of
the same religious persuasion, but in the lat-
ter type of firm the strategy of a taxi driver
was to camouflage his own religious identity,
especially when the destination was in the other
community. Gambetta & Hamill describe the
various approaches adopted by customers and
taxi drivers to signal to the other a sense of
trustworthiness.
The research in Israel is more comprehen-
sive with respect to organizational adaptations,
linking them to behavioral shifts by individ-
uals to reduce their risk. Some 20 years ago
Kimmerling (1985) noted that since its found-
ing Israel has had to contend with a perpet-
ual state of conflict with its neighbors. In the
process it has developed a flexible social sys-
tem that permits rapid adjustments during pe-
riods of acute military crisis. Kimmerling was
writing about the impact of intermittent war
and disruptions from having to mobilize large
segments of the population, but his argument
also pertains to terrorist attacks. Chronic ter-
rorism over many decades has required Israeli
institutions to formulate and refine policies for
minimizing its impact. These include govern-
mental programs to quickly rebuild an attack
site, compensate victims, and memorialize the
fallen. Several nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) supplement these tasks with their own
activities, sometimes motivated by religious
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imperatives. Commercial establishments have
had to develop their own sorts of adaptations,
in this case driven by the necessity of respond-




To lessen the impact of an attack on the morale
of the population,5 the Israeli government has
instituted a policy of rapid cleanup. If the at-
tack is at a retail establishment, then within
hours the street is swept, shattered windows
are replaced, and other repairs are undertaken.
Complementing these efforts, ZAKA, an ul-
trareligious NGO, combs the impacted area
for human remains and prepares the dead for
burial. This activity is taken so very seriously
that ZAKA members are continually on call,
with transportation ready; often they appear
at an attack site as quickly as the ambulances
(Stadler et al. 2005). In short, despite the chaos,
a semblance of normality is quickly established,
and there is a sense that the fatally injured have
received respectful treatment.
Victims of attacks are quickly compen-
sated by Bituach Leumi, a quasi-governmental
agency similar to the U.S. Social Security
Administration.6 As a country that frequently
has had to put its youth in danger and has striven
to present soldiering in narratives of heroism
and honor (Bilu & Witztum 2000, Vinitzky-
Seroussi & Ben-Ari 2000), Israel provides ex-
tensive services to the families of the fallen. A
1970 law extended this consideration to vic-
tims of terrorist attacks, defining them, along
with soldiers, as casualties in the battle for the
5A critical contribution to population morale is the high cred-
ibility of the government in its efforts to protect the popula-
tion. These include military strikes into the West Bank and
Gaza, intended to disrupt the terrorist infrastructure, as well
as a variety of security measures such as ones adopted with
regard to airline safety. The comprehensiveness of passenger
scrutiny is legendary, as anyone who has come to Israel on El
Al Airlines can attest (Tucker 2003).
6The comments in this section are based on interviews we
conducted with the senior staff of Bituach Leumi.
state’s existence.7 Additionally, all persons who
entered Israel legally and become casualties of
a terror attack are entitled to this assistance, in-
cluding tourists and foreign workers.
Because terrorist attacks are sporadic, few
staff members of Bituach Leumi have dedicated
responsibilities to this work. But when an attack
takes place, there is an immediate shift in the
agency’s operation. Hotlines are opened; the
staff goes to hospitals to see victims; if there
are fatalities, they visit with the families dur-
ing grieving. The staff is available both day and
night. Tasks of these sorts are labor intensive.
When the needs in an attack area exceed the ca-
pability of the local staff, workers are brought in
from other offices. Also, the emotional demands
of this work are considerable, and counseling is
provided, when necessary, to staff workers.
If government agencies and NGOs have
taken on the chore of attributing meaning to
the loss of life and maintaining solidarity, com-
mercial actors have had to face the task of
adapting to the changing behaviors of the pub-
lic that were prompted by the attacks. Stud-
ies of the effects of terrorism on economic be-
havior can usefully be put into two categories:
effects on macroeconomic indicators and the
consequences for particular industries. In the
first category are examinations of the economic
performance of the country; we also include
here studies of the impact of the attacks on
electoral outcomes because it is a macro vari-
able. The second category covers a variety of
industries; most have been adversely affected
by the terror, though some, such as protective
services, have benefited from a climate of fear
and threat. A number of the studies are based on
household surveys of consumption, which per-
mit insight into how the socioeconomic char-
acteristics of individuals have influenced their
adaptations.
7The national day of mourning for fallen soldiers of Israel’s
wars was renamed to include terror victims. The intent is
to underscore the view that civilians in Israel are also at the
frontline of the battle. The state hopes that by turning terror
victims into war heroes they are manufacturing social consent
and support for its policies.
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Macroeconomic Consequences
The overall impact of terror on the economy
is complex, and there is some dispute as to
whether terror has a large or a small effect. Re-
viewing this literature, Krueger (2007, p. 119)
concludes that if terrorism is frequent and sus-
tained, the effect can be considerable. In the
case of Israel, a number of studies support this
view. Eckstein & Tsiddon (2004) find a nega-
tive impact on GNP, investments, and exports.
Undertaking a counterfactual experiment, they
conclude that in the period 2000–2003 terror-
ism was responsible for a reduction in per capita
production output of some 10%. Persitz (2007)
reports similar findings, adding that the average
Israeli lost some 12% of real income during this
period. In a more general study of macroeco-
nomic effects, Blomberg et al. (2004), using
panel data from 177 countries covering the in-
terval 1968–2000, conclude that terrorism con-
sistently had a negative impact on economic
growth. Also, it had the effect of redirecting
economic activity away from investment and to-
ward government spending.
Haj-Yehia (2006) examined how the tem-
poral pattern in consumption expenditures has
been affected by the attacks. He suggests that
Israeli households tend to perceive the terror
as temporary; this is because the military takes
steps to suppress new outbreaks and because
the Israeli experience has been one of intense
episodes of attacks followed by long periods
of relative calm. Extrapolating from a general
equilibrium model of temporary income shocks
on the timing of purchases, Haj-Yehia argues
that the experience of “temporary terror”
should have a greater effect on purchases
of durable goods than nondurables, initially
delaying the former. Over a long period, this
would generate a boom-bust cycle in durables
expenditures, with the bunching of purchases
after an initial delay. Using time series data on
attacks during 1980–2002 along with national
accounts figures, Haj-Yehia reports strong
support for both contentions.
The stock market has been of particular in-
terest to researchers because the data are pub-
licly available, collected daily, and appear re-
sponsive to mood swings in the population.
Eldor & Melnick (2004) have examined the loss
in stock market value due to terrorist attacks.
Utilizing a counterfactual strategy, they esti-
mate that the Tel Aviv-100 index was 30% lower
in 2003 than in 2001, a consequence of the in-
tense terrorist activity in this period. When the
attacks were disaggregated by method of execu-
tion (suicide, armed assault, bombing, kidnap-
ping), they found that the stock price reduction
was largely a result of the suicide attacks; this
type of assault appears to generate the greatest
fear and anxiety.
An interesting application of the stock mar-
ket data has been to assess the reaction to
assassinations of senior leaders of terrorist orga-
nizations. This counterterrorism policy of the
Israeli military has been controversial, both for
moral reasons and because of questions about its
effectiveness. Zussman & Zussman (2006) un-
dertook an investigation of the immediate ef-
fects of the attacks on the morale of Israelis,
as measured by stock market moves on the Tel
Aviv exchange. They report that the market
declined after assassinations of senior political
leaders but rose following the targeted killing
of military leaders. They interpret the stock
moves as suggesting that the first type of action
is viewed by the public as counterproductive,
likely to lead to further attacks, but that the sec-
ond is considered an effective counterterrorism
strategy.
It is intimated by Zussman & Zussman
(2006) that the magnitude of stock market
moves reflects the extent of media coverage of
an attack. Melnick & Eldor (2007) examine this
relationship more closely. They find that me-
dia coverage is the main channel by which ter-
rorist attacks produce market declines; other
characteristics of an attack (e.g., locale, number
killed) have no effect once the extent of cover-
age is controlled. Indeed, the magnitude of the
market decline following an attack is a mono-
tonic function of the amount of coverage. These
results reinforce the notion that media coverage
is a critical route by which terrorism achieves
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its objective of demoralizing the public in a tar-
geted country. However, Melnick & Eldor note
that, with the passage of time, the impact of the
media coverage of an attack declines, suggesting
a tendency toward routinization of the threat in
the consciousness of Israelis.
The influence of terrorism on politics can
be profound and is one of the primary goals
of the attacks. Terrorists are keen on chang-
ing opinions and determining the discourse in
a democracy, if not altogether toppling a gov-
ernment. They clearly have the potential to
impact public opinion and electoral outcomes.
Willer (2004) used Gallup poll data from the
United States from 2001–2004 and time se-
ries methods to show that government warnings
about terror threats led to increased support for
President Bush. In Spain, the Madrid train
bombings in 2004 are credited with bringing
about the victory of the Socialist party in that
year’s parliamentary elections (Bali 2007).
The effect on election outcomes in Israel
is addressed in two recent papers by Berrebi
& Klor (2006, 2008). The main finding is that
the electorate is sensitive to terrorist fatalities,
with attacks shortly before an election generat-
ing support for right-leaning parties, whereas
periods of calm favor the leftist factions. Since
the parties on the right are more intransigent
toward territorial compromise, why then do the
terrorists choose to attack before an election?
Berrebi & Klor speculate that, because there
are several Palestinian terrorist groups with
competing agendas, the reasons for a particu-
lar attack can be difficult to decipher. For some
groups the intent is to sabotage the peace pro-
cess, while others may want to provoke Israeli
retaliation in the belief that this will radical-
ize the Palestinian population, potentially pro-
viding them with new recruits. In short, what
may appear counterproductive in terms of the
manifest goals of the Palestinian movement can
be quite rational at the level of the operative
terrorist group.
Thus, the summary effects of the terror on
Israeli society are that they have been costly
and disruptive. The attacks of the Second
Intifada (post–September 2000) are credited
with reducing economic output in the coun-
try by some 10% over what it otherwise would
have reached; also, electoral decisions have been
deeply influenced by the timing of the attacks.
Indeed, the moderate political parties have been
weakened, and many Israelis now hold the view
that terror attacks will continue even if a polit-
ical settlement is reached with the Palestinian
leadership (Bar-Tal & Teichman 2005). At the
same time, economic development in the coun-
try has been robust, and, judging from the psy-
chological literature, the morale of the popula-
tion has not eroded much.
Impact of the Terror
on Different Industries
There are quite interesting dynamics within the
economy of an impacted country that highlight
the shifting incentives and opportunities arising
in a context of chronic terror. These processes
can be discerned when specific economic sec-
tors are examined. Thus, retail establishments
and public transportation are particularly ex-
posed. They have often been the targets of at-
tack, and customers are quick to adjust their pa-
tronage behavior when they sense that they are
at risk. Firms in other industries might not be
directly exposed but can be harmed by shifting
customer behavior in the establishments that
they provide with stock. In still other indus-
tries, such as defense and security, the compa-
nies might well benefit financially from a con-
text of threat and terror.
Tourism is fickle, as destinations can eas-
ily be substituted. Tourists often choose among
multiple enticing sites and may be deterred
from vacationing in a country if there is fear
for personal safety. Indeed, several studies have
traced declines in tourism to terror attacks [see
Aziz (1995) for Egypt; Mansfeld & Kliot (1996)
for Cyprus; Mansfeld (1999) and Morag (2006)
for Israel]. Enders & Sandler (1991) estimate
that a typical terror attack in Spain between
1970 and 1988 led to a decline of 140,000
tourists in the following months. In a panel
study of the impact of terror in the period 1977
to 2000, covering all countries with available
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data, Neumayer (2004) concludes that a one–
standard deviation increase in terror events in a
country lowered tourist arrivals by 8.8%.
An interesting addition to this literature
concerns the differential response by foreign
and domestic tourists in Israel. Fleischer &
Buccola (2002) examine hotel stays and find the
expected decline by foreign tourists, but no re-
duction by Israelis; indeed, they report a small
increase in hotel stays by Israelis during periods
of high terror. They attribute this to a supply ef-
fect; management reduces prices in an attempt
to fill rooms left vacant by the decline in foreign
tourism. It appears also to reflect a tendency by
local residents to temporarily leave the main
cities, which are frequent terrorist targets, for
hotels elsewhere in the country.
Tur-Sinai (2006) collected data on commod-
ity purchases from large retailers during the
period 2000–2004 and used this material to ex-
amine the responses by consumers to terror at-
tacks. He divided purchases into durable and
nondurable goods and examined the change in
average sales during the three days following
an attack with the three days prior to the event.
Tur-Sinai finds a larger decline in the purchase
of durables, but also a tendency for the im-
pact of terror to weaken over time. He inter-
prets the latter result as suggesting a habitua-
tion effect—acceptance of the possibility of an
attack as a “normal risk,” similar to that of a
traffic accident.
A step toward exploring the effects on dif-
ferent industries is provided by Berrebi &
Klor (2005). They sought to assess the rel-
ative impact of terrorism on defense- versus
nondefense-related companies. Using stock
market data on 65 Israeli firms, matched with
counterpart companies in the United States to
establish a counterfactual, they examined stock
movements during the interval January 1998–
September 2001. Since the Second Intifada up-
rising began on September 28, 2000, the se-
lected time interval can be viewed as including
both pre- and post-treatment periods. Consis-
tent with other studies of effects on the econ-
omy, they find a significant negative impact of
terrorism—but only for nondefense companies.
For firms in the defense or security industry,
the violent outbreaks had a positive effect on
stock valuations. They conclude that much of
the increase was due to heightened exports of
Israeli defense products to other countries—a
perverse benefit from having had the opportu-
nity to field test antiterrorist equipment in one’s
own country.
The security industry has grown rapidly be-
cause restaurants, cafes, and other retail estab-
lishments have been the target of many attacks,
and customers have rapidly adjusted their shop-
ping behavior to reduce risk. Customers not
only move to stores in closed shopping malls,8
but also show a preference for guarded estab-
lishments when patronizing street cafes and
restaurants. As a consequence, there has been an
expansion of security guard services, from 1.3%
of the labor force in 1995 to 2.0% in 2003. Many
of the new workers have been recruited as they
complete military service; thus, the average age
of security workers has declined. Also, the new
job opportunities have encouraged the weaker
socioeconomic segments of Israeli society, such
as recent immigrants, to seek employment in
the security sector despite the risks inherent in
the work (Handels 2004, Shemesh 2007).
According to the director of a large security
firm whom we interviewed, the labor demand
in the industry can be divided into two cate-
gories: one for combat-skilled guards who are
employed at high-profile institutions and an-
other for less skilled security workers who are
stationed in front of restaurants and small retail
establishments. Demand for the highly skilled
workers has not grown, as they tend to be per-
manent employees engaged at work sites that
have been guarded for many years. However,
there has been a huge increase in the demand
for less skilled guards. Retail establishments use
8Mall security in Israel is organized in concentric circles, with
checks of the trunk and passenger compartment of vehicles
entering the parking area and the questioning of drivers to
determine whether they pose a security threat. Unlike in the
United States, ethnic profiling is used. Inside the mall, armed
security guards patrol and observe shoppers. Israel has had
ten attacks against malls in recent years, but none has pene-
trated into the interior (Davis et. al. 2006, p. 30).
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them as deterrents, hoping that a terrorist will
chose another, less protected target. In some
cases the guards are not armed or carry fake
guns. Indeed, some store owners fear that an
armed guard could be a menace to patrons, es-
pecially because the danger often comes in the
form of a suicide bomber who is attempting to
blend in with other customers.
This raises an issue of the dilemma faced by
a security guard when he suspects that an ap-
proaching person is a suicide bomber. His job
assignment is to prevent the person from en-
tering the establishment. But if the suspicious
person is challenged, and he is a terrorist, he
likely will ignite the bomb, killing the guard
as well as himself. Carrying a weapon does not
solve the problem unless the guard is prepared
to use it whenever an approaching person ap-
pears suspicious. Although we did not succeed
in getting a clarification of this problem in our
interview, the fragility of the task of the guard
was made clear in a newspaper article follow-
ing a 2005 attack at the entrance to a shopping
mall in the city of Netanya in which a security
worker was killed when he confronted a sui-
cide bomber. Several guards subsequently quit;
one remarked: “Only a fool will stay in such a
job, or a person who wants to commit suicide”
(Ben-Zur 2005).
Studies of the Israeli experience appear now
to be focusing on the dynamic response to at-
tacks and how this varies by socioeconomic
group and by type of target. For example, if
a bus is attacked, what is the impact on rider-
ship and how long before it returns to the prior
level? Further, is there a differential response
in ridership by social class or other background
characteristics? To these questions we add con-
siderations of how individuals reassess their vul-
nerability after an attack is reported in the me-
dia. Thus, what is the response to an attack at
one kind of target (e.g., a bus) on the patronage
of other sorts of establishments (e.g., restau-
rants)? Similarly, what is the effect of an attack
in one city on the behaviors of residents in a dif-
ferent city? Although studies of these issues are
only beginning, there already are results worth
noting.
Becker & Rubinstein (2007) have made the
most consequential contribution to our under-
standing of these matters. Using the Israeli
Household Expenditures Surveys for 1999–
2004 and associated biweekly diaries, they con-
structed a data set containing daily household
expenditures for bus transportation, taxis, cof-
fee houses, and restaurants, along with back-
ground characteristics of the respondent. These
materials have permitted an examination of the
dynamic response by the public to different
sorts of attacks.
Public buses have been a frequent target of
terrorists, and because passengers are crowded
in a confined space these assaults have been par-
ticularly lethal. From 2000–2005, there were 23
bus attacks, resulting in 205 fatalities (Becker &
Rubinstein 2007, Table 2).9 How, then, does bus
ridership respond in the days following an at-
tack? Using Poisson regression models, Becker
& Rubinstein report that the number of bus
tickets sold in the week following a bus attack
declined by 5.7%. However, much of the fall
off was temporary; two weeks later some half of
the initial loss had been recovered.
Becker & Rubinstein (2007) also examined
whether riders take into account the level of
risk of the bus route. Most of the attacks have
taken place in the metropolitan regions of the
country. Dividing the sample into households
residing in a major city and those living else-
where, they note that the fall off in ridership af-
ter a bus attack is much greater for city dwellers.
This finding is reinforced by an examination of
expenditures for taxi rides following a bus at-
tack. Not surprisingly, the increased use of taxi
services takes place entirely in the metropoli-
tan areas. Thus, there is clear evidence of a
9Because attacks on buses have come to symbolize the vul-
nerability of the civilian population, the Israeli government
set up policing units called “Magen units” in 2001, which
included specially trained guards and dogs to systematically
inspect popular bus lines. In interviews, an official at Dan Bus
Lines in Tel Aviv described a myriad of strategies used by the
company to protect passengers. These include spot checks by
police units as well as technologies to sniff explosives at the
entry to buses. Yet, the official’s view was that these strategies
are more effective in providing a sense of security to riders
than in stopping a determined terrorist.
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substitution effect in mode of transportation
in the locations where commuters feel most
threatened.
Along with buses, coffee shops and restau-
rants were frequent targets of terrorists, and
Becker & Rubinstein (2007) assessed the effects
of an attack on the patronage of these estab-
lishments. In this case, the exposure variable is
“attack not on a bus,” and they find that this
event is associated with a reduction of 15% in
the number of visits to cafes and restaurants.
Dividing the sample into single and married re-
spondents, they note that the patronage decline
is entirely due to behavioral shifts among the
married. Single persons, they speculate, are de-
pendent on these public places for meeting and
dating activity, making them more inclined to
assume the risk of a possible attack.
The theme of differential response by dis-
tance from the attack site is picked up by
Stecklov & Spilerman (2008). They used a data
set on daily sales at three cafes in a chain of cof-
fee houses. While all the stores are located in
the Jerusalem region, they differ in vulnerabil-
ity to an attack. Two are exposed to street traffic,
while the third is in a gated shopping mall. Not
surprisingly, the response to a terror incident is
a decline in sales in the exposed shops, but little
change in the protected cafe. In the former, the
sales decline is brief, dissipating after 3–4 days.
When the attacks are categorized by distance
from Jerusalem (“within the city” versus “else-
where”), the incidents in Jerusalem showed a
much stronger impact on the exposed shops.
A summary calculation finds a sales reduction
from an attack in Jerusalem, relative to an at-
tack elsewhere, of 7.6% in one of the exposed
coffee shops, 4.5% in the second. Again, sales in
the protected shop are not significantly affected
by an attack, whether in the city or elsewhere.
Apparently, then, individuals code their vul-
nerability in terms of physical proximity to the
site of a recent attack. What about the target of
the attack? Do people associate vulnerability in
a particular behavioral area with the choice of
target in a recent attack? Stecklov & Spilerman
(2008) examined this issue by comparing the
change in coffee shop sales depending on
whether the attack was at a restaurant/coffee
shop or on a bus. The results are dramatic:
sales at the two exposed coffee houses aver-
aged a 2.5% reduction in the days immediately
following a bus attack, but a 23% reduction sub-
sequent to an assault at an eating establishment.
Clearly, whether rational or not, individuals as-
sess risk in terms of the similarity of a contem-
plated behavior to the target of a recent attack.
To summarize, the Israeli material conveys
the complexity of adaptations in different sec-
tors of the economy. At one extreme are bus
lines, restaurants, and cafes, which have borne
the brunt of the attacks. At the other extreme
are the security guard firms that have thrived
on the terror threat and now even market
their expertise to other countries. Yet, even for
them there is concern about the economics of
a boom-and-bust business. The demand for
guard services is highly volatile, as many re-
tail establishments are quick to shed the cost
of guard services as soon as there is a lull in at-
tacks. Indeed, the rapid recovery of patronage at
cafes and restaurants makes clear that the prob-
lem for retail firms is largely short term, except
when there is a prolonged series of attacks.
CONCLUSIONS
Terror’s primary aim is to achieve a political or
emotional victory rather than an outright mil-
itary defeat of the enemy country. This is ac-
complished by the targeting of civilians and na-
tional symbols of the society. Thus, while the
casualty count is generally lower than in war,
and the structure and institutions of the soci-
ety are left basically intact, terrorism can gen-
erate widespread fear and anxiety, prompting
changes in behavior and in organizational ar-
rangements. However, because the society is
generally left intact, we can study the social con-
sequences of terror to identify the pathways by
which individuals and institutions have adapted.
What, then, have we learned about the impact
of terror attacks on a social system?
First, the temporal pattern of the attacks
matters greatly. Chronic terrorism leaves a
much more pervasive footprint on a society than
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a single strike, however massive. In the case of
a one-time attack, the abnormality of the situ-
ation tends to be emphasized. In terms of cog-
nitive processing, it is so far outside the range
of normal experience that, although the attack
may provoke acute stress, it does not alter one’s
concept of normality or require a modification
in coping style. The research questions that are
posed center upon the extent of perturbation
from one’s emotional stasis and the time path
in the return to equilibrium. Not surprisingly,
the more sociological investigations concerning
the impact of an attack on organizational actors
are also cast in the imagery of exogenous shocks
and stages in the return to normal functioning.
The disasters model, which conforms well with
this imagery, has therefore come to be the fo-
cal paradigm in studies of the impact of solitary
attacks.
Chronic terrorism, by contrast, provokes
adjustments that are deep and long lasting. Be-
cause the population is constantly under risk of
attack, often for many years, a different sense
of normality has to be internalized. While the
attacks continue, there can be little expectation
of a return to the status quo ante. At the psycho-
logical level, this raises issues of what is an ap-
propriate coping style in this kind of menacing
environment, as well as questions of population
morale; the latter is a particular concern of a
government seeking to frustrate the intent of
the terrorists. At the macro level, terrorism has
a negative effect on aggregate economic out-
put, though there is considerable heterogeneity
in how different industrial sectors tend to fare.
In short, the impact of terrorism is far from
uniform.
Second, the social context matters. This
is especially the case with respect to chronic
terrorism because there is more time for the
adjustments to unfold against a background
of specific institutional arrangements. In a
sectarian-riven country, the terrorist attacks ap-
pear to initiate a dynamic that reinforces ex-
isting cleavages and divisions, with the effect
of further polarizing the society—at least, this
is the story with respect to Northern Ireland.
However, in a relatively cohesive society like
Israel, the fact that the threat comes from ac-
tors external to the state serves to heighten sol-
idarity as the residents come to see themselves
as confronting a common threat. In Israel, the
approach taken to enhancing security is many
layered. It begins with military actions against
the terrorist groups and moves to interdiction
and apprehension strategies by the police and
then to the protective steps taken by commer-
cial firms for their own safety. But successful
strikes do occur, and Israelis have come to ac-
cept some level of terrorism as a fact of life,
much as they do road accidents. Actions by the
government to minimize the impact on popu-
lation morale when an attack is successful then
come into play.
From a sociological point of view, chronic
terrorism in a cohesive society is probably the
most interesting case because it produces a
rich array of behavioral changes and compen-
satory adjustments by institutions and commer-
cial firms. On the surface, the behavioral modi-
fications would seem to be rational; thus, there
is less use of public transportation and fewer
visits to restaurants because both have been fre-
quent targets of terrorists. However, this ratio-
nality tends to have a short temporal horizon,
and after an attack there is a rapid return to
prior behavioral routines. Moreover, individu-
als appear to associate risk with similarity of a
locale to the site of an immediately prior at-
tack, though there is no reason to think that a
strike on a bus makes another bus attack more
probable than, say, the bombing of a restaurant.
Commercial establishments must be re-
sponsive to the concerns of customers, and the
Israeli studies make clear the range of adjust-
ments that have been taken to convey at least a
sense of safety. One of the more interesting or-
ganizational developments concerns the emer-
gence of a new type of private security firm that
specializes in the provision of guards to retail
establishments. Private security is hardly novel,
but these firms have traditionally operated in
an environment in which demand is stable, or
at least can be predicted. In Israel, however, the
demand is intense immediately following an at-
tack but then declines rapidly, requiring a large
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pool of potential guards willing to work for brief
periods. This personnel problem is managed by
recruiting college students and the recently de-
mobilized, as well as pensioners and the unem-
ployed. Given that army service is nearly uni-
versal in Israel, there are many in each category
with small arms training who are available for
short-term employment.
The theoretical models that apply to social
system adjustments in the case of chronic ter-
rorism are less developed than in the case of
a single strike. There is no coherent counter-
part to the disasters model that might provide
an account of the unfolding adaptations that
take place in a country confronting frequent at-
tacks, although the Israeli experience provides
some insight into how terrorist shocks cascade
through the system and are dealt with and ab-
sorbed. While the adjustments clearly depend
on the social organization and institutional ar-
rangements in a country, the Israeli case pro-
vides a starting point for comprehending the
consequences of a prolonged encounter with
terrorism.
The exposure to terrorism in the United
States is limited, and public awareness of the
terrorist menace has been molded by a very
few attacks on prominent public buildings. But
in many respects the greater threat to morale
and to social stability might come from fre-
quent small-scale assaults on diverse mundane
targets—a bombing on a bus or subway, in a
restaurant or department store, or on a crowded
street. Such attacks would be deeply intrusive in
our daily lives and in our association of safety
with routine activities. They would make clear
our constant vulnerability to mortal attack and
raise concerns, each morning, about loved ones
when they depart for work or school. Yet, there
are countries that have had to confront this sort
of menace for many years, and we would do well
to learn from their experience.
One may also wonder about the new bonds
that are being forged by common encounters
with terrorism. This possibility was expressed in
an interview with Indian businessmen following
the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai,
in which they remarked on their new-found
feelings of empathy with Israelis (Freedman
2008, p. A21). More generally, Beck (2002,
p. 43) has suggested that because societies are
facing common threats—from terror as well as
from financial and ecological risks—this will
likely stimulate the formation of new and novel
international arrangements. Clearly, we stand at
the beginnings of a portentous era in globaliza-
tion and have a great need to construct institu-
tions that can handle the profound challenges.
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